T HIS PAPER SEEKS to pave the way for future dialogue between Psychoanalysis and the myriad strands of practice that, taken collectively, carry the name Cultural Studies. Dialogue is needed in order for Cultural Studies practitioners to move beyond an impasse at which, in my view, they now arrive inevitably in 'doing' cultural theory. In what follows, I shall explain how this impasse emerges in such inevitable fashion along the lines of the so-called Structure-Agency debate, but I will explore the possibility that Psychoanalysis provides a viable solution to the problem. In short, I propose that where Cultural Studies has conventionally found purchase in the idea of deep structures beneath the surface of cultural production, which inevitably leads to the impasse that I am describing, Psychoanalysis provides a conceptual arsenal that enables us to understand how structures are embedded in what I call the 'deep surface' of cultural production. I will explain that this solution requires not simply taking psychoanalytic concepts or models and inserting them into existing frameworks. The onus must be on establishing a genuine dialogue, exchanging ideas, and learning key lessons from the practice of Psychoanalysis as much as from abstract metapsychological writings.
Of course, we must dispel at the outset any suggestion that there is likely to be widespread resistance to a dialogue of this kind. Indeed, the study of the mind has never been far from the minds of those who seek to define the machinations of culture. As Clifford Geertz notes in 'Culture, Mind, Brain / Brain, Mind, Culture,' transgressions of the boundaries between Anthropology and Psychology go back as far as when Edward Tylor first defined culture in the 1870s, while reflecting on the 'cognitive insufficiencies of primitive religion' (Geertz, Available Light 204) . Geertz is himself a chief proponent and exponent par excellence of the blurring of disciplinary boundaries from within Anthropology. Yet we must not presume that Cultural Studies is synonymous with Anthropology. As suggested in the opening paragraph, Cultural Studies is being viewed here as a disparate set of practices, many of which show little evidence of commonality in any disciplinary sense. Simon During's brief history, in his introduction to The Cultural Studies Reader, accounts for the way in which the field has long been in continual flux, 'shifting its interests and methods both because it is in constant and engaged interaction with its larger historical context and because it cannot be complacent about its authority' (17). During's point is that for all of its many faces, Cultural Studies has most often reflected a desire to give legitimacy to the study of those cultural practices that have been previously either marginalised (as minority or 'mass' culture) or ignored outright. In this sense, Cultural Studies shifts interests and methods as the rules of engagement shift in the ongoing battle to give valence to the disempowered. Thus, we get a picture of the history of Cultural Studies as at first being informed by Leavisite literary studies, then by Althusserian critiques of ideology, then by sociology, semiotics, social semiotics and so on. What this history seems to suggest is that what all practitioners of Cultural Studies share is a propensity for borrowing from other disciplines for the purpose of continu-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES, VOLUME 3, NUMBER 12, 2009 http://www. SocialSciences-Journal.com, ISSN 1833 -1882 ally reinventing 'cultural studies' as a kind of perpetually revisionist arm of Literary Theory.
If Cultural Studies fails to resemble a coherent disciplinary organisation of concepts, methods and objects of study, the problem is exacerbated, as During points out, by a 'cultural turn' in the majority of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and that much of the work done by anthropologists, geographers, historians, literary critics, sociologists and others is lumped together by publishers and booksellers under the catch-all rubric of 'cultural studies' . Against this seeming proliferation, During stresses the need for practitioners to define their method as a 'discrete mode of analysis … which, for convenience's sake, I'll call "engaged cultural studies"' (24). Even in attempting to lend clarity to the task at hand, During cannot but be drawn into the empty proliferation of the key terms: to define Cultural Studies, I shall refer to 'engaged' cultural studies. Yet all is not lost. By describing engaged cultural studies as a 'mode of analysis,' During participates in a language that is identifiably aligned with Literary Theory. The term 'analysis' refers in this context to a critical reading that describes both the structure and content of a text. It is worth noting at this point that analysis as it is understood in Literary Theory should not in any way be seen as coterminous with the practice of psychoanalysis and should never entertain pretensions to that effect. Psychoanalysis is of course a specific set of strategies for negotiating the engagement between analyst and analysand for the purposes of treating psychical dysfunction. The mistake made by many literary critics in the past has been to see the text or characters within a text as a viable substitute for an analysand. Analysis as it is understood by During in this definition of Cultural Studies refers instead to a practice that treats its object as object rather than as the putative co-participant in an intersubjective relation. Cultural Studies is thus a 'discrete mode' of reading, the lineaments of which can be compared to what otherwise normally passes for literary scholarship, but the comparison -the basis for framing a discreteness of the mode -comes down ultimately to the type of object involved. Here, then, is the crux of the matter. Since so many different types of objects have become the focus of the many different types of scholarship called Cultural Studies, blanket definitions of the field tend to narrow in on similarities in method alone.
Attempts to define Cultural Studies rarely draw on any systematic or sustained elaboration of the thing itself -'culture' -which lends to the field its name. I think this is in part due to the fact that so many of the leading practitioners, from Leavisite critics onward, have had their academic training in literary scholarship. The use of the term 'cultural' merely serves as a designator for a mode of analysis set apart from 'literary' studies by virtue of having as its specific object a non-literary kind of text. Ultimately, the practitioner of Cultural Studies is still 'doing' textual analysis. Another reason for the absence of any sustained elaboration of what is understood by the term 'culture' within Cultural Studies may indeed be the kind of sensitivity to disciplinary borderlines which During lists as a factor in the field's metamorphoses. As a mode of analysis, he observes, Cultural Studies represents less a discipline than 'a field within multidisciplinarity' (27) capable of being transported from one discipline to another, although this more often than not manifests as borrowing from one discipline after another rather than genuine intervention. As habitual border hoppers, practitioners of Cultural Studies will be aware that the obvious source from which to borrow a definition of 'culture' -Anthropology -has itself been a locus for the blurring of disciplinary boundaries for much of the past three decades. Even within Anthropology, the definition of culture has itself been under review on the basis of rethinking occasioned by an exchange of ideas with literary scholarship.
To give an example of this, in a gesture that is typical of the self-reflexive turn in interpretive anthropology during the past three decades, James Clifford once described cultures as 'ethnographic collections' (230). Clifford's point is partly figurative, but also partly literal. The point works by highlighting the idea that the cultures described by ethnographers only exist as such within the ethnographers' descriptions. Ethnographers are thus like collectors because ethnography (writing about the culture) is a strategic and very selective assignment in which 'diverse experiences and facts are selected, gathered, detached from their original temporal occasions, and given enduring value in a new arrangement' (Clifford 231) . Such admissions are, as I indicated, typical among the writings of that generation of anthropologists, like Clifford Geertz, for whom questions of methodology became synonymous with issues of ethnographic authority, representation, subjectivity, and textuality, giving rise to an interest in the theoretical work being done by literature scholars. Yet for David Chioni Moore, the preponderance of material on these subjects has, ad nauseum, led to the emergence of a discourse he calls 'anthro-apology' (354). The concern for Moore is that ethnographers can become so conscious of writing about culture that they begin to resemble a little too much the literature scholars from whom they borrow these concerns. Yet Clifford's observation suggests already that anthropological navel gazing involves more than reflection upon the plight of anthropologists in their role as authors. Certainly, much has been written on the subject, following the lead provided by Geertz in his perennial attempt to blur boundaries between anthropology and literary theory. Yet if Clifford's 'culture collectors' construct the cultures they purport to study, it is not simply in the extent to which they are the authors of the worlds described in their fieldnotes and published works. This is therefore the degree to which we should take Clifford's point literally: anthropologists collect tangible material evidence of their encounter with another world. Objects granted the status of artefact provide a supposedly stable point of reference as the correlation between the subjective realm of the fieldnote and the world of things. I say 'supposedly': just as he focuses on some different aspect of anthropological practice, Clifford is drawn toward an admission that would no doubt drive dissenters like Moore to distraction. He notes that even in the act of gathering, an anthropologist makes value judgements based on a grand narrative of historical decay, with the simple act of gathering fashioned in the mind of the practitioner as the 'rescue of phenomena' to give 'form, structure and continuity to a world' (231). This is to say even culture collecting is, a fortiori, storytelling. Against this teleological narrative of decay and preservation, Clifford notes that a different type of narrative is brought into play by the ethnographer: a chronotope (231). The term is taken, not surprisingly, from Literary Theory, as it was devised by the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin to designate the fictionalised location in time and space that functions as a 'setting' in which certain kinds of stories such as a novel can be enacted. In a literary narrative, a chronotope creates the illusion that the events and characters described possess a corporeal reality. For Clifford, in an ethnographic text, a chronotope functions as an index of reality but literally in the sense of there having been a here and now to the anthropological encounter. Artefacts add a sense of concreteness to the immediacy of the chronotope: artefact and chronotope are blended in what might be called the phantasy of a stable point of reference beyond the text.
In this way, I suggest, ethnographic practice is the expression of a desire for an external point of reference. Clifford himself points out that attempts to define the term culture in any general sense always ultimately run hard up against the 'need to be able to speak holistically of Japanese or Trobriand or Moroccan culture in the confidence that we are designating something real and differentially coherent' (230). We arrive, therefore, at a kind of impasse in which a desire for an external point of reference is only ever prolonged but never gratified. An ethnographic text holds out for the promise of 'a culture' that lies beyond description, yet always defers realisation by delivering a hollow shell, a representation, in its stead. Does this mean Anthropology's self-reflexive turn has exposed this discipline's own contradictions, and that what Moore calls anthro-apology is thus the lament of those whose own life's work has ultimately been revealed (by themselves) to be empty? If such a statement holds true, then what hope the Cultural Studies scholar who seeks to borrow a stable catch-all referent -'culture' -to posit as the marker of a particular kind of text capable of being subjected to sustained scrutiny?
Expressed in these terms, the obstacles may seem insurmountable, hence the suggestion that we arrive inevitably at an impasse. Yet I contend that the value of reflexive anthropology has been in foregrounding the difficulties associated with attempting to study (therefore, to represent) what is ostensibly nothing less than the condition of representation. Clifford's definition of culture as ethnographic collections provides one perspective on this issue. Geertz's seminal Interpretation of Cultures provides another, not surprisingly borrowing from elsewhere in order to elaborate his most significant methodological claim. Geertz reiterates one of Gilbert Ryle's thought experiments: how do we know when a wink is not a wink and merely a twitch and when it is something else altogether, such as a fake-wink, a burlesquefake-wink and so on (7)? The experiment was invented by Ryle in order to demonstrate the degree to which human actions are inflected with depth in intention, volition, context and circumstance which are not always contained in a simple account of the act itself. Thick description, rather than thin, is needed to account for these depths. Yet this is as far as Ryle's invented example takes the point, since it is enough to argue that depth is realised in the level of description. For Geertz, the interpretation of culture is as much about the relative depth of the thing itself as it is about the complexity of the descriptions by the anthropologist. What Geertz did with Ryle's experiment was to incorporate it into a structuralist view of cultural formations. To simplify the difference between the two, I will say that for Ryle the distinction between a twitch and a wink rests in the 'shared' meaning held by two or more individuals; for Geertz, the distinction is determined by the system of meanings that govern behaviour in a particular place and time. For Ryle, the distinction is at best semiotic, whereas for Geertz it is cultural, by which he means it functions at the level of deep structure. This also marks a point at which Clifford and Geertz part company, for the former maintains that cultures (representations) are principally constructed on the side of the observer, while the latter maintains that culture (deep structure) determines first and foremost what can and cannot be observed. Both, however, share a passing concern with the role of interpretation in giving form to observation.
The approaches of Clifford and Geertz, two of the principal protagonists of an interpretive Anthropology in the last thirty years, are thus markedly different, yet the terms with which we have identified this difference also enable us to mark out a common domain. Both are concerned with upsetting traditional anthropological relations between observers and observed phenomena, with interpretation as the pivotal term unhinging the relation. Clifford's stance is that interpretation always mediates between the observer and cultural phenomena, leading him to conclude that a designation of phenomena as 'cultural' is an observer's prerogative. Geertz also sees interpretation as an intermediary, yet he concludes that this points to a structure of meaning beyond cultural phenomena. In both views, of course, the anthropologist-cum-collector-cum-author still occupies the position of an observer observing phenomena from beyond. This brings me to a key point here: because interpretation is cast here as the intermediary between observer and observed, it reveals itself as principally heuristic, as if the final goal of cultural studies is to determine what its object is. In order to do this, it needs its object to be relatively fixed and therefore capable of being observed. For this reason, I suggest that the anthropological encounter as imagined in the work of Clifford, Geertz and their colleagues adheres primarily to what I loosely call an 'archaeological' paradigm. Reduced to its most fundamental level, this paradigm refers to the synechdocic process by which an observer identifies patterns in pots and spearheads and other miscellaneous objects, which, as artefacts, then come to stand in for a presumed collective totality -a culture.
John Barrett points out that the discipline of Archaeology has been trying to overcome just such a deterministic bias for the past twenty years. Against the assumption that the primary goal of Archaeology is to generalise 'in terms of large-scale spatial regularities' and 'long-term historical trends' (143), Barrett observes that during the 1980s archaeologists began concerning themselves with questions of agency. He notes also, however, that the concern with agency has still involved mapping the role of agents in shaping or transforming large-scale patterns, and he concludes with a renewed call to abandon the structuralist focus on parts and wholes: 'The social totality,' he insists, 'should not form the basic domain or unit of archaeological study ' (155) . The difficulty is in finding a way of making sense of individual practice in terms of a 'field of productive relations' rather than 'the isolated presence of an individual's experience' (158). Ultimately, Barrett imagines that Archaeology must break free from its own limitations by adopting the idea of a social system, rather than a social totality, from sociological theory, a la Anthony Giddens.
Barrett's terms are interesting, and we can reflect on them here as instructive of the difficulty confronted by cultural theorists, this impasse to which I have been referring. The status of the artefact within this paradigm is indicative, shall we say, of things having been made, where the passive voice is in the ascendancy. Even Geertz's Balinese cockfighters, his own example of thick description, are evidence that something has been made -in this case, meaning, but as I said it is not so much meaning shared as it is meaning structured. The artefact is held to signify only that a structure of signification exists before it. 'Things having been made' points toward a different generalisation but a generalisation nonetheless: rather than a structure of signification, this is the field of productive relations. The idea that somebody made these things is an unnecessary -indeed, unwelcome -complication, as Barrett suggests when he recognises the difficulty posed by the presence of the individual. Here, then, is the crucial sticking point around which the impasse takes shape: observed phenomena are held to be representative rather than representations in their own right. Representation, as we have seen, is a part of the ethnographic exercise, as produced by the ethnographer. What is needed, I suggest, is for the observer to become somewhat myopic, concentrating attention at first on the individual. I emphasise 'at first,' since I maintain that we should not discard the existing paradigm; merely that we should enrich it. My point is that descriptions of cultural phenomena can become thicker still by taking into account the highly concentrated field of an individual practice within which meanings and objects are generated. This does not mean that we can only understand cultural phenomena if we know precisely who it was that made it; rather, it means that we must at least be prepared to recognise in the object or observed phenomena the fact of having been produced by somebody, and that this somebody is capable of being understood in terms of a psychological depth, rather than as the top layer of a system or structure shaping human practices from beyond. The goal, to which I believe Psychoanalysis is uniquely positioned to contribute, is to understand how such systems and structures are generated by human agency.
Why is Psychoanalysis so well positioned to do this? The answer lies in the status it attributes to its principal object and in its method. As R.H.Hook states the case in a fundamental form, Psychoanalysis sets itself apart from other disciplines even within Psychology in the extent to which its methods and theories refer at all times to that which is unconscious and which therefore 'cannot be conceptualised otherwise than by inference from its known and observable consequences' (117). As we have seen, the study of culture also conceptualises its object principally by inference from observed phenomena, interpreted as the known consequences of a deep structure. At the risk of making too much of such a similarity, I would like to use it as a starting point for fashioning the dialogue between psychoanalysis and Cultural Studies. The important point to be made here is that both Psychoanalysis and the study of culture rely on interpretation as a way of managing what amounts to a constitutive gap in knowledge, the void each aims to fill. In the study of culture, we this leads to an impasse. Where I think Psychoanalysis provides a way beyond the impasse is in that crucial clinical function to which psychoanalytical knowledge is put. Psychoanalytical interpretation is not held to be the convenient pivot between an observer and an observed phenomena or thing. Interpretation intercedes only within the fact of the intersubjective relation between analyst and analysand, both of whom are autonomous meaning making agents. As Hook points out, citing Wilfred Bion, the analytic procedure is not concerned ultimately with knowing the content of the unconscious -it deems this unknowable from the outset -since all that can be known of the unconscious are the transformations the 'thing in itself' undergoes (117). Hook adds in parentheses that another word for these transformations is 'representation,' and it is on this point that I want now to focus.
I noted that the anthropological impasse inhered in the treatment of individual objects as representative, rather than as representations. Hook's point brings us closer to seeing how the treatment of culture as representation shifts not only the locus of production (from a field of relations to an individual agent) but also the causal relation between structure and agency. If on the other side of the object we posit an autonomous meaning making agent, rather than an independently deep structure, we restore to the object its status as a representation. Yet armed with Hook's point about the transformations of the unconscious being otherwise viably known as representations, we need not think of representation purely in terms of an authorial intention, for example. Interpretation of what the object represents can and should go beyond what the maker intends, and can include the metastases of a maker's unconscious. This does not yet mean that we have addressed the issue of how the deep structures identified by the cultural scholar are generated by a human agent. Nevertheless, we have put the first stone down in paving the path along this royal road. If we accept that these structures are expressed in some way within the object, rather than being imposed by the observer, then the introduction of the human agent into the formula of cultural production suggests also that these structures are somehow put there by the agent. The most obvious mistake that the cultural scholar can now make is to assume that agency presupposes a conscious decision to impose one's will upon something. Here Psychoanalysis can provide significant assistance.
The lesson that Psychoanalysis has long been teaching Literary Theory can be carried over to cultural texts: any act (of communication, of production) carries with it a number of unconscious effects that exceed the intentions of the agent. It is my suspicion that the deep structures identified by the cultural scholar are a residue in the object of a particular kind of unconscious effect. This is why I feel that dialogue is necessary, rather moreso than borrowing from Psychoanalysis for the benefit of answering a conundrum for Cultural Studies. Through this dialogue, cultural scholars should be able to gain greater insight into the nature of what has previously been understood as deep structure. Of reciprocal benefit may be the identification of a specific cultural function of unconscious processes, although any claim on my part about the value of such a dialogue for psychoanalysts is clearly more speculative than my comments about the benefits to Cultural Studies. To conclude, then, I will simply provide a glimpse of where this dialogue might proceed in terms of Cultural Studies.
Theories pertaining to ego formation describe the process by which our sense of our self as a functional and functioning human being hinges upon a relatively stable -yet always so easily shattered -self-image which is nothing less than a projection of the physical surface of our bodies as the limit of the psyche. These ideas mean, in other words, that ego formation is representational, which is to say that the ego emerges as a result of our representation of oneself to oneself. A function of ego formation is to maintain the boundary between the interior and the exterior of our self, this 'skin ego,' as Didier Anzieu called it. In a special edition of The International Journal of Critical Psychology in 2002, I attempted to draw on these ideas to pin down a definition of a term that had begun proliferating in critical parlance in the 1990s: embodiment 1 . I defined embodiment in that essay as 'the ways in which the unconscious posits its own exterior' (53). I want to extend that definition here by suggesting that from a psychoanalytic standpoint agency and embodiment are two functions of the process of establishing and maintaining the boundary between the interior and the exterior of the unconscious. We are embodied by virtue of positing a sense of exteriority beyond the limit represented by our bodies, and we possess agency by virtue of confirming the capacity of our bodies to engage with this exterior world. Agency is thus always inflected as a projection of the inner self onto the exterior of the self. We assume then that the projections of the exterior onto the interior of the self work against agency. Is this perhaps what Candida Yates and Shelley Day Sclater are describing when they propose the term 'cultural psyche' to refer to that sense we have of our personal subjectivity being shaped by what seem to us to be external forces (136)? With this term, of course, Yates and Sclater seek to bridge the gap between structure and agency, showing that culture is structured internally, in accordance with the structure of the psyche, and is not imposed from without. In order to address the impasse within Cultural Studies, I think we must go further.
The notion that culture is structured in accordance with the structure of the psyche cuts off in advance the question of why, if cultures come from within each of us, our cultural products show levels of uniformity, or patterning, enabling the cultural scholar to interpret them as evidence of a deep structural matrix shaping cultural production from beyond. The notion of a cultural psyche suggests that the deep structures evident in cultural products are the same structures evident within both the mind of the producer and the observer. My concern is that this does not adequately address the issue of differences between cultures. Rather than relying on the structure of the psyche in toto, I would like to leave open a possibility that this cultural psyche is a representation of a deep structure. Let us never forget the lesson of Freud's initial attempts at a project for a scientific psychology, in which we see the topography of the mind coalesce around the range of core functions (eventually defined by Freud as the Unconscious, the Ego, the Id, and so on), but with the content of each seen as being continually in flux. Our engagement with the world does not take place in a void, and our representations of the exterior world are limited to some extent by the shape of this world. As we are continually in contact with 'cultural' objects, then our range of possible cathexes, possible day residues, possible repressed materials, and such like are limited by the shape of the objects around us. This is also how I see a 'cultural psyche' functioning. Our sense of our self, and our modes of engagement in the world -that is to say, our embodiment and our agency -are delimited to a great extent by the world as we perceive it, and this in turn shapes how each of us project ourselves back into this world, through our 'cultural' products. Culture is no longer conceived here as deep structure, on the other side of the object; rather, it is what I would call the 'deep surface' of the object. Our actions (as agents) in the world serve to remind us of the exteriority of this world, yet this is an exteriority always posited, always negotiated and revised in order to protect our sense of our own fundamental interiority; accordingly, the deep structures that we find (as cultural scholars) in the objects produced by these actions are already projected as possessing the quality of a structure out there, beyond us, yet seeming also to act through us since it is patently apparent here in what we make, these 'cultural' products. Deep structures are thus projected onto objects, as onto the surfaces of our own bodies, as a part of the way we shape our reality. This is to say that surface -the surface of the object and the surface of my bodyis itself always being renegotiated in the process of maintaining a sense of self. The depth we presume to be on the other side of these surfaces is a necessary formation in order to create the illusion of permanence; that is, to fix our sense of who we are in relation to the world around us. Yet this depth emerges only in the positing of a surface, and must therefore be continually instantiated anew, time after time, in every version of a surface that we produce.
If dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Cultural Studies can produce a more nuanced and 'deep' model of cultural production along these lines, the challenge that lies before practitioners of Cultural Studies will of course be to embed these ideas in their discrete modes of analysis, as During described it. Yet for dialogue to be truly open-ended, these modes of analysis may indeed require a less discrete approach. Again, I will emphasise that I do not see this as an invitation to adopt a directly psychoanalytical mode of inquiry in relation to cultural objects: we do not seek to treat the objects of Cultural Studies after the manner of a patient in the clinic. Yet the idea of deep surfaces demands a mode of analysis that recognises both agents and structures as comingled in a process that does not originate in any ontological sense with either, but also as equally plausible subjects of inquiry in a heuristic sense; that is, as viable explanations for the origins of an object. A goal of an analysis of deep surfaces will, therefore, be to refuse to countenance mutual exclusion of agency and structure as determinants in the shape of cultures and the objects through which we seek to 'read' culture.
